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Background: Multi-site health sciences research is becoming more common, as it enables investigation of rare
outcomes and diseases and new healthcare innovations. Multi-site research usually involves the transfer of large
amounts of research data between collaborators, which increases the potential for accidental disclosures of
protected health information (PHI). Standard protocols for preventing release of PHI are extremely vulnerable to
human error, particularly when the shared data sets are large.
Methods: To address this problem, we developed an automated program (SAS macro) to identify possible PHI in
research data before it is transferred between research sites. The macro reviews all data in a designated directory to
identify suspicious variable names and data patterns. The macro looks for variables that may contain personal
identifiers such as medical record numbers and social security numbers. In addition, the macro identifies dates and
numbers that may identify people who belong to small groups, who may be identifiable even in the absences of
traditional identifiers.
Results: Evaluation of the macro on 100 sample research data sets indicated a recall of 0.98 and precision of 0.81.
Conclusions: When implemented consistently, the macro has the potential to streamline the PHI review process
and significantly reduce accidental PHI disclosures.
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Studying rare outcomes, new interventions, and diverse
populations frequently requires collaborations across mul-
tiple healthcare institutions. As the capacity to exchange
health research data grows through the development of
distributed research networks, healthcare research col-
laboratories, and computing grids, the amount of new
public health research involving partnerships across aca-
demic institutions, healthcare delivery systems, insurance
providers and pharmaceutical companies is also growing
[1]. Existing large-scale multi-site research and public
health collaborations include HMO Research Network
(HMORN) [2] based projects such as the Cancer and
Cardiovascular Research Networks, the Vaccine Safety* Correspondence: Christine.E.Bredfeldt@kp.org
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orDatalink [3], and the Centers for Education and Research
on Therapeutics [4], the FDA Sentinel project [5] and the
Scalable PArtnering Network (SPAN) [6], among others.
These collaborations often require the release of ag-
gregated patient data or fully or partially de-identified
patient-level information from participating institutions
to the lead research site. Occasionally fully-identifiable
patient information is required, subject to Institutional
Review Board (IRB) approval and appropriate Data Use
Agreements (DUAs).
In accordance with the Privacy and Security Regulations
of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 (HIPAA), collaborating institutions work closely
with their IRB to ensure that protected health information
(PHI) used in research meets the “minimum necessary”
requirements and has all appropriate safeguards [7]. As
public health research collaborations grow more common,
the potential for accidental disclosure of PHI also grows.al Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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several accidental disclosures including temporary data
that were accidentally released to the lead research site,
multi-site extraction programs that failed to completely
replace patient identifiers with de-identified study ids, and
programmers who forgot to remove one or more of the 18
patient identifiers described by the Privacy Rule from the
final data sets. Given the tight deadlines and complex data
sets often required by multi-site research, accidental inclu-
sion of PHI in research data sets is a real concern. Methods
that make it easier to identify PHI and determine whether
it is authorized for a given research project could signifi-
cantly reduce accidental unauthorized PHI disclosures.
Effective PHI management requires efforts at multiple
levels including national and organizational policy inter-
pretation, access control, and control over data release.
Ontology-based models have been developed to imple-
ment national and organizational policy as rule-based
systems that control data access based on a complex
interrelationship between the data user, the patient, and
the purpose of the data use [8]. These systems control
who has access to the data using metadata attached to
the data elements. At the data release level, the goal is
generally to release the least amount of personal data
necessary to achieve the scientific objective. To that end,
there have been several efforts to develop methods to
scrub PHI from electronic health records to make them
more accessible for research. Most de-identification
techniques have focused on removing all PHI from text
such as discharge notes, radiology or pathology reports,
or progress notes (see [9,10] for reviews) in order to
allow the text to be shared with collaborators or other
researchers. These techniques focus on scrubbing all
PHI elements from the medical record data through
either lexical, heuristic or pattern based systems or
machine learning approaches. However, many collabora-
tive research data sets consist primarily of structured
data, which may or may not be allowed to contain PHI
elements depending on the IRB agreements. For ex-
ample, some elements of PHI, such as names or medical
record numbers, may need to be removed from the
research data sets, while other elements such as birth
date and gender may be allowed to support the research.
In these cases, protecting PHI during research may
primarily require comprehensive review of the research
data sets prior to disclosure to ensure that only allo-
wable PHI is included.
Existing PHI review techniques primarily rely on
humans to review the data and interpret and apply the
PHI restrictions correctly. However, reviewing large,
complex data sets can be difficult: study data sets
frequently include thousands to millions of records and
it’s unrealistic to expect the data reviewer to review
every record for data that may qualify as PHI. Methodsthat reduce the burden on the data reviewer by automa-
tically identifying possible PHI in collaborative data sets
have the potential to significantly reduce the probability
of accidental PHI disclosure.
In this work, our goal was to create an automated
process that would reduce the manual effort of checking
the research data sets for PHI. The purpose was not to
scrub the data sets of PHI, but to alert the researchers of
PHI contained in the data sets for cross-checking against
IRB and DUAs. We formed a group of 5 experienced
multi-site programmers (PHI Work Group) to identify
and address the most common causes of accidental PHI
disclosure. The group identified five major problems that
may lead to accidental disclosure of PHI:
1. Inclusion of data sets meant to be retained locally in
the data that gets transferred to the lead site.
2. Failure to substitute a study-id for patient identifiers.
3. Failure to “scrub” patient identifiers, such as medical
record numbers and social security numbers from
the data set prior to transfer.
4. Inclusion of dates that indicate rare characteristics,
such as advanced age (i.e. age > 89)
5. Indications of small populations with rare disorders.
To address these issues, we developed a macro to
identify PHI in SAS data sets prior to data release.
Methods
Data environment
The HMORN is a consortium of 19 health care delivery
organizations that conducts collaborative research on a
wide variety of healthcare topics [2]. To facilitate colla-
borative research across disparate healthcare delivery
organizations, the HMORN has developed a set of stan-
dardized data specifications for a virtual data warehouse
(VDW) [11]. To obtain data for multi-site research pro-
jects, HMORN analysts at the lead research site develop
and distribute SAS scripts using common variable names
to reference the standardized data structures. Participa-
ting sites run the scripts within their own environment
and transfer the resulting data sets to the lead site for
final analysis. The transfer data sets can range from
aggregate counts to patient-level data about encounters,
diagnoses and procedures, prescriptions, and lab test
results depending on the research needs, the DUA and
the IRB agreement.
Transfer of data from participating sites to the lead
research site represents the greatest risk of inappropriate
PHI disclosure during the research project. Every effort
is made to restrict the transferred data to the minimum
necessary for complete and accurate study analysis, in-
cluding de-identification, assigning study IDs, and redac-
ting counts that may identify small populations with rare
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To ensure transfer data sets include appropriate data only,
all data sets must be reviewed prior to transfer to ensure
that they do not contain PHI beyond what is allowed
under data sharing and IRB agreements. Data set review
involves identifying and removing any disallowed vari-
ables, as well as reviewing the data itself for individual
instances of PHI. This is particularly difficult for items
such as small cell sizes and ages greater than 89, which
can be buried in a single record of a massive data set.
Manually checking every data set to make sure it does not
contain unauthorized data, including PHI, can be a time
consuming and error-prone process.Approach
The three project requirements were: 1) the PHI identifi-
cation process must identify the most common forms of
PHI in structured data; 2) the process must be fast to
implement to allow quick turnaround; and 3) it must
leave the decision about whether PHI is allowable in the
hands of research personnel. Based on these require-
ments, the PHI Workgroup developed an automated
program (macro) designed to identify potential PHI in a
SAS analytic environment, referred to as the PHI Detec-
tion macro. The macro evaluates the directory containing
files to be transferred to the lead programming site (trans-
fer directory), identifies SAS data sets, and scans each SAS
data set for possible PHI elements. The macro uses a pat-
tern matching approach and is designed to work on data
sets that contain structured data. It relies primarily on
regular expressions to identify patterns consistent with
medical record numbers of social security numbers, field
formats to identify dates, and keywords as fieldnames.
The PHI detection macro is designed to run in SAS
9.1 or higher. The macro analyzes the data in the trans-
fer directory at two levels: a high-level overview of all
files in the directory for comparison against the pro-
gramming workplan, and a detailed analysis of the data
in each data set. The results of all analyses are printed to
a PDF report for review prior to data transfer. The code
for the PHI detection macro can be downloaded from
https://github.com/HMORN/phi_macros.Table 1 Example of strings that may indicate PHI if they are u
Type of PHI Potential variable names
Medical Record Number MRN, Medical_Record_Number, Med
Subject Name Name, First_Name, Last_Name, birth_
Social Security Number SSN, social_security_number, SocialSe
Birth/death dates Birth_date, bday, birthDate, death_da
Health encounter dates Encounter_dt, enc_dt, encDt
Locally “forbidden” variable names Medical_history_number|MHN|Pat_ID
This list is not exhaustive.The high-level analysis consists of a scan of all files in
the transfer directory. The macro creates a summary
listing of each file type and the number of files matching
that file type in the directory. It also creates a directory
listing of each file in the directory, including the name
and file type. For SAS data sets, the directory listing also
indicates the creation date, modification date and the
number of records in the data set. The detailed analysis
provides four separate checks on each data set. The first
data check looks for variable names that may indicate
common PHI elements such as personal identifiers, birth
dates, health encounter dates and death dates. Site-
specific variable names that may indicate PHI can be
specified as a pre-defined global variable. For example,
sites which use the variable med_rec_no to refer to a a
patient's medical record number may want to ensure
that med_rec_no does not occur in transfer data sets.
All variable name checks are case insensitive. Table 1
provides examples of some of the strings evaluated in
this data check. An example of a site-specific string is
shown in the last row of Table 1.
The second data check performed on each transfer
data set evaluates strings in the data set to determine if
the data matches a regular expression that represents
the site’s standard personal identifiers (i.e. Medical
Record Numbers). Regular expressions are a highly flex-
ible method for defining text strings to be used in string
comparisons. For example, a medical record number
that consists of 8 to 9 numeric characters would be
defined as “(^\d{8, 9}\s)”, and would match the string
“12345678” in the data set. The macro uses the SAS
function prxmatch to compare character data in the data
set to the regular expression. The macro can be custom-
ized to evaluate every record, or to restrict the evaluation
to a specific number of records to improve processing
speed.
A third data check evaluates the transfer data sets con-
tain dates that may reflect birth, death or healthcare
utilization dates. The data check further evaluates the
contents of all date variables to determine whether the
date may indicate a person over age 89. The macro uses
89 as the default age, as specified in the Privacy Rule [7],
but individual sites can override the default to flagsed as variable names





Bredfeldt et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2013, 13:39 Page 4 of 7
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/13/39younger ages. Variables are considered date variables if
either the variable format is a date type, or the variable
name contains the word “date.” For each date variable,
the macro reviews all records to determine if the data
set contains any dates that may indicate the patient was
older than 89. The macro also looks for variable names
containing the word “age” and looks for records that
may identify individual patients who are older than 89.
The purpose of the fourth data check is to identify
small groups that may indicate rare conditions or treat-
ments. According to the privacy rule [7], individuals
with rare or uncommon diagnoses or conditions may be
identifiable even when the 18 specific patient identifiers
are removed [7] and therefore information about indi-
viduals with such rare conditions should be considered
PHI. The macro scans all numerical variables in the
transfer data sets to identify values between 1 and 5
(inclusive) and prints a report listing all numerical vari-
ables with values between 1 and 5.
The final step in the detail analysis is to print 5 sample
records to the PHI report. The sample records allow the
data reviewer to manually review all variable names and
a subset of data to find any potential PHI the automated
analysis may have missed.
Evaluation
We measured the performance of the phi detection macro
by testing it against two types of data. The first test data
set consisted of fake data that contained multiple examples
of PHI: dates, names, addresses, medical record numbers,
birth dates, and social security numbers. We ran the
macro on the directory containing the fake PHI data and
evaluated how many of the PHI types the macro identified.
For the second test of the PHI macro, we created a
collection of 100 data sets from previous research projects.
The collection included data sets that were shared with
other research sites, as well as data sets that were meant
to be retained locally. Data sets in the collection contained
a variable level of PHI: some data sets contained names,
addresses and medical record numbers, while other data
sets contained no PHI. We restricted each data set to 50
records to facilitate manual review.
We used manual review as our gold standard of PHI de-
tection. Every data set was reviewed by two people to ensure
that all examples of PHI were identified. For each instance
of PHI, we captured the field name and type of PHI to a log.
Once all test data sets had been hand reviewed, we executed
the macro on the directory containing the collection of data
sets, and cross-checked the PHI report against the PHI log
generated from the hand review process.
Results
The HMORN PHI Workgroup developed a SAS macro
designed to identify PHI in research data sets. The PHIdetection macro scans the transfer directory to identify
files to review and performs a detailed analysis of each
SAS data set in the transfer directory. The macro pro-
duces a PDF report that the site data reviewer, usually
the research analyst or project manager, can review to
ensure that any data to be released from the collabora-
ting site is consistent with the data sharing and IRB
agreements and does not contain unauthorized PHI.
Examples of complete reports using fake patient data
can be found at http://mapri.kaiserpermanente.org/re-
search/mapri-sample-reports/.
The PHI detection report contains two sections: the
overview and the detail section. Figure 1 shows an
example of the PHI detection report. The overview
section provides a count of files by file type and a listing of
all files in the transfer directory. Figure 1a illustrates a typ-
ical example of the overview section of the PHI Detection
report. The file listing includes a record count for all SAS
data sets, as well as the date each data set was created and
modified. Both the file count and the file listing can be
compared to the expected output described in the pro-
gram’s workplan to evaluate whether the program has
produced the correct data sets and to ensure there are no
unexpected files in the transfer directory. In addition,
when the data sets contain individual-level data, the rec-
ord count for population data sets can be compared to the
estimated size of the target population to ensure that the
program is identifying the appropriate population.
The detail section of the PHI detection report
(example shown in Figure 1b) contains information
about each data set in the transfer directory. The report
contains three subsections for each data set: warnings
regarding potential PHI the program has identified, sam-
ple records, and information about low values of the
numeric variables. The warnings subsection contains the
results of all automatic PHI checks, including checks for
“forbidden” variable names, comparisons of string data to
potential study identifier formats, and checks for dates
greater than the cutoff value. If any of these checks iden-
tify data that may be PHI, a warning is printed to the
report describing the potential problem. An example of
these warnings is shown in the top section of Figure 1b.
The second subsection of the detailed analysis of each
data set displays a small number of example records
from the data set for manual inspection. In cases where
potential problems have been identified such as variables
that meet the defined pattern for a medical record num-
ber, or records with small or zero numerical values,
records containing the identified concerns are selected
for review. In cases where the macro has not identified
any specific concerns, five random records are selected
for review. Figure 1b shows the case where the macro
has identified two potential concerns: records with data
that contain patterns that are consistent with PHI, and
Figure 1 Example of a report from the PHI detection macro. (a) High level analysis showing the number of files in the transfer directory, by
file type. (b) Detailed report of potential PHI in the sas data set files in the transfer directory (top), as well as example records (middle) and
minimum values of numerical variables.
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ally small populations. The sample records allow the
data reviewer to examine specific examples to determine
if the records genuinely contain PHI, and prompt the
reviewer to check any PHI found in the data set against
the IRB and data sharing agreements.
The final subsection identifies the minimum value of
all numeric variables in the data set. This analysis
assumes that numeric variables may represent counts of
events or members of a population. If the minimum
value of a count variable is zero, it may represent miss-
ing data and indicate that there is an error in the code
that needs to be reviewed. In addition, according to
HIPAA, populations with between 1 and 5 people maybe considered PHI if they have rare conditions because
it is relatively easy to identify the individuals in the
population. Thus, if the minimum value of a numeric
variable is between 1 and 5 (inclusive), that variable
should be inspected to ensure that either it does not
represent a population count, or low population counts
are allowable in the transfer data sets based on the IRB
approval and data sharing agreements.
Performance: We first evaluated the PHI Detection
macro on three test data sets containing a variety of PHI,
including medical record numbers (MRNs), social security
numbers, ages greater than 89, birth dates, and small pop-
ulations. The PHI report correctly listed all 20 fields that
either contained PHI or were likely to contain PHI based
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study-specific identifiers, and was flagged by the report).
We next evaluated the PHI Detection macro on 100
research data sets, comparing the PHI detected by the
macro to that found on manual review. The test data
sets were drawn from a combination of site-specific data
(likely to contain PHI) and collaborative data (should
not contain extensive PHI). Each test data set was
restricted to the top 50 records to improve accuracy of the
manual review process. Manual review was performed by
two experienced research analysts to ensure accuracy. The
PHI Detection macro correctly identified 111 out of 113
instances of PHI in the test data sets, for a recall of 0.98.
There were also 26 false positives out of a total of 809 data
fields, for a specificity of 0.96. The macro has a precision
of 0.81, and an F-score of 0.88.
Discussion
We developed a SAS macro program to identify poten-
tial PHI in collaborative data sets. The macro scans all
data sets in a given directory for variable names, data
patterns, and numeric values that may represent PHI.
Metadata about the data sets in the directory is printed
to a PDF report, along with any warnings identified in
the data. The analyst or investigator can then use the
report to determine if the research data sets contain
unauthorized PHI.
Managing PHI carefully in multi-site research environ-
ments is critical to protecting our patients and comply-
ing with federal laws. In this paper we describe an
approach for identifying PHI in collaborative research
environments that work primarily with structured data,
such as utilization records, lab data and patient vitals.
Our approach uses a relatively simple pattern matching
method that leverages the metadata contained in struc-
tured data fields through two techniques: 1) pattern
matching on field names; and 2) using field data types to
identify dates. We further use regular expressions to find
fields containing distinctive identifiers such as medical
record numbers and social security numbers. By lever-
aging the structure of the data sets, we are able to use a
relatively small dictionary of 21 terms that can be
customized as needed for each site. Despite the limited
data dictionary, the macro has high sensitivity and speci-
ficity in identifying common PHI elements such as med-
ical record numbers, dates and patient names.
The majority of previous efforts at PHI protection for
multi-site research have focused on de-identifying or an-
onymizing free-text documents such as pathology reports
and progress notes (see [9,10]). Free text can contain com-
plex forms of PHI such as proper names, making them
much more difficult to scrub. These efforts have led to the
development of more sophisticated machine learning and
lexical, heuristic and pattern based methods for identifyingPHI. These methods often require a large corpus to train
the machine learning algorithms, or an extensive diction-
ary to support the pattern matching approach [9]. In cases
where multi-site research is conducted entirely on struc-
tured data where there is less variability in the data and a
more limited set of potential PHI elements, these ap-
proaches may be more sophisticated and resource inten-
sive than is necessary. A simple method that quickly and
accurately scans a large body of data to produce a PHI re-
port could significantly improve the probability of identi-
fying unauthorized PHI prior to transfer.
Our approach differs from many PHI-protection
approaches in that it focuses on identifying, but not
removing, potential PHI. Previous privacy protection
methods on structured data have focused on anonymi-
zing the data by removing data points until individuals
are statistically indistinguishable [12]. However, this
method is open to reverse engineering and may remove
critical data attributes [13]. In this work, we start from
the perspective that many multi-site research projects
have IRB approval to share certain types of PHI neces-
sary for adequately answering the research question. The
aim with this work was to generate a report that would
allow a human reviewer to determine whether any PHI
identified in the research data sets can be shared with
other research sites based on both IRB and DUAs.
The macro is not meant to replace human review of
the data sets. Rather, it is intended to increase the
efficiency and completeness of the data review. Manual
review can be tedious and inaccurate for research pro-
jects containing multiple data sets with thousands to
millions of records each. By explicitly generating war-
nings regarding potential PHI elements in the data sets,
the macro draws attention to data that may need closer
review prior to release. In addition, the PHI detection
macro is able to review every record for inappropriate
dates, ages or counts, which can be impossible for a
human to do in a large, complex data set. Finally, by
providing a clear list of all files in the transfer directory,
the macro makes it easier to confirm that only the
intended files are included in the transfer directory.
As with other PHI-protection procedures, the macros
are only effective if multi-site programmers use them
properly. The four most common problems that may
reduce the effectiveness of the macros is specifying the
wrong directory for data review, failing to adequately
specify the regular expressions used to define key identi-
fiers, failing to review the reports produced by the macros,
and failing to run the macros prior to transferring the
data. Three of these four problems can be addressed by
using a PHI checklist for final review. Such a checklist
would prompt the data reviewer to compare the informa-
tion in the PHI report to the information in the program’s
workplan to ensure the transfer directory contains the
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under the terms of the IRB approval and DUAs. The
fourth problem (incorrect specification of the regular ex-
pressions) can be addressed by testing the regular expres-
sion definition against some sample data using publicly
available tools such as http://www.regextester.com/.
Conclusions
The PHI Protection macros described in this paper are
intended to reduce accidental PHI disclosure in multi-
site research using structured data by automating the re-
view of shared data sets. The automated review provides
a report describing all files in the transfer directory,
including warnings if it finds common indicators of PHI
in either the data sets or the programming logs. When
used in conjunction with a careful, checklist-guided
manual review of the data for unauthorized PHI, the
macro has the potential to significantly reduce accidental
PHI disclosures.
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